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Multiple occurrences of large international protest mobilisations in the 
past thirty years (ecology, anti-nuclear, anti-war, anti-globalisation) lend 
credence to the hypothesis of the transnationality of social movements. For 
the American social movement theorist Sidney Tarrow, shared grievances 
across borders do not necessitate the formation of effective and sustained 
activism that could contribute to transnational movement identities (1). Yet, 
when confronted with sets of opportunities that are conducive to cross-border 
exchanges, activists engage in collective, public, contentious and transnational 
efforts to make claims on international policy or social values. International 
organisations and finance bodies, multinational corporations and global media 
and lobby institutions have all contributed to the emergence of mobilisations 
that are targeted at networks of globalisation, with high levels of mobility, 
coordination, and communication across nation-state boundaries. There is 
now a large body of research to analyze the mobilisation across borders and 
the resulting collective action in a multi-level political context. What is more, 
this work mostly identifies, in parallel with institutional and cultural processes 
of European integration, the ‘Europeanisation of protest’ (2). Transnational 
contention in Europe increasingly uses mobilisation frames that are linked 
to and targeted at the policy-making of the European Union. Transnational 
protest against war is also considered to be a bottom-up process of identity 
formation. Particularly, the mass-scale anti-war protests of 15 February 2003 
ahead of the allied invasion of Iraq are cited as examples of a correlation 
between international policy issues and transnational activism (3).
 (1) Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2005.
 (2) Doug ImIg & Sidney Tarrow, eds., Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics 
in an Emerging Polity, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001; Bert KlandermanS et al., 
“Social Movements and Europeanization”, in West European Politics, vol. 33, 2010, p. 399-
414; Donatella della porTa & Manuela caIanI, “Europeanization from Below? Social 
Movements and Europe”, in Mobilization: An International Quarterly, vol. 12, 2007, p. 
1-20; D. della porTa & M. caIanI, Social Movements and Europeanization, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2009; Andy maTherS, Struggling for a Social Europe: Neoliberal 
Globalization and the Birth of a European Social Movement, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007.
 (3) Jürgen habermaS & Jacques derrIda, “February 15, or, What Binds Europeans 
Together”, in Daniel levy, Max penSKy & John Torpey, eds., Old Europe, New Europe, 
Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War, New York, Verso, 2005, p. 3-13; 
Helma de vrIeS, “Europeanization, Enlargement, and the Emergence of Transnational 
Contention”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 
48th Annual Convention, Chicago, 28 February 2007.
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This article takes a broader view of transnational activism to extend this 
analysis into the realm of extreme nationalist movements (4). To what extent 
do far right and neo-fascist activists maintain transnational networks, socially 
or politically? Is there evidence of a common movement identity, especially 
in Europe? Does Europe in fact entail a particular power of mobilisation for 
extreme nationalist politics? To answer these questions affirmatively should 
prove controversial. Nationalist politics and transnational activism appear to 
be mutually exclusive. Although, to some extent, the formation of far right 
factions in the European Parliament has institutionalised co-operation of 
extreme nationalist parties and organisations in Europe, they are rarely able 
to find a long-lasting common denominator, as episodic failures to maintain 
a coherent far right coalition in the European Parliament illustrate. Often, co-
operation remains on the level of a ‘Europe of nations’ rather than a ‘Nation 
Europe’, and so appears more international than transnational.
However, the focus on such obvious instances of cross-national alliances 
of the far right risks underestimating a radical Europeanism as the source of 
neo-fascist agitation. It would neglect the fact that fascism has strong roots 
in a potentially unifying Euro-centric ideology. This Europeanism, however, 
is not necessarily at odds with nationalism. Based on common ideological 
positions, we can witness increasing networking attempts on organisational 
levels that contradict the exclusive juxtaposition of nationalism and 
internationalism (5). It is certainly the case that both far right political parties 
and the militant neo-Nazi scenes are building European connections not 
solely on the basis of co-operation but with reference to a perceived common 
‘destiny’. Whether it is at white-supremacist music festivals or during ‘peace’ 
marches, Europe’s ultra-nationalists assert their common European identity. 
At first this appears contradictory given the strong xenophobic elements that 
persist in those political movements. However, a look at the history of the 
continent’s fascist ideology reveals this neglected aspect in the study of the 
far right: extreme nationalism and pan-Europeanism have gone hand in hand 
throughout their intellectual history and continue to do so.
While this is not true of all far right political action, the ‘European faction’ 
of the extreme right can rally behind the perceived values of Europe and unite 
against the perceived threat of American cultural imperialism. As we will 
see, those find some resonance in contemporary neo-Nazi social movements. 
Those movements have put a focus upon building a European network based 
upon a common understanding of notions of Western (European) culture 
and values. To illustrate this, this article draws on instances of neo-Nazi 
and far right mobilisation in Germany. This is no arbitrary choice of case 
study. Today, Europe features largely in German nationalist politics, which 
is further accompanied by a close relationship of the Third Reich’s National 
Socialism and the topic of Europe. The example of neo-Nazism in Germany, 
 (4) A rare example of this approach is Devashree gupTa, “Nationalism Across Borders: 
Transnational Nationalist Advocacy in the European Union”, in Comparative European 
Politics, vol. 6, 2008, p. 61-80.
 (5) See for example Thomas grumKe & Thomas greven, eds., Globalisierter 
Rechtsextremismus? Die extremistische Rechte in der Ära der Globalisierung, Wiesbaden, 
VS Verlag, 2006; Christina S. lIang, ed., Europe for the Europeans: the Foreign and 
Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007.
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but also neo-fascist agitation in other European countries, indicates a shift on 
the right-wing extremist agenda that is increasingly concerned with questions 
of social equality, employment, globalisation and even capitalism (6). 
Remarkably, a diverse European extreme nationalist movement that calls 
itself ‘anti-capitalist’ can be identified. Movement supporters attend Mayday 
rallies, demonstrate against the institutions of global capital and mobilise 
to anti-war protests. The rhetoric employed thereby strikingly resembles 
criticisms that are familiar in the left-wing anti-globalisation movements. 
We will thus first identify extreme nationalist activism as an instance of 
anti-globalisation protest in the German context, before drawing out some 
of the historical precursors to contemporary far right Europeanism. Finally, 
contemporary examples of transnational movement mobilisation that have a 
distinct European, as well as extreme nationalist, dimension are explored. 
Apart from secondary sources, in order to demonstrate the continuing 
importance of the transnational notion of Europe in the mobilisation of 
extreme nationalist activists, the article cites primary texts that convey a far 
right self-understanding as anti-globalist, yet international. Primarily these 
include the websites and flyer texts for far right anti-globalisation protests 
in Germany and rallies that drew participants from across the continent. 
However, to complete the picture, anti-fascist research and literature is also 
used. All translations from German into English are mine.
Nationalism as a social movement
The erosion of the European model of the welfare state is not just a 
topic for left-wing political parties and social movements. Increasingly, 
neo-fascists and neo-Nazis have begun to adopt the ‘social question’ for 
their own political purposes (7). With attempts to scapegoat immigrants for 
economic and social problems, extreme right-wing parties have found enough 
justifications to oppose an attack on Keynesian-style politics by onslaught 
of neo-liberal globalisation. Neo-liberal welfare reforms have angered far 
right voters across the continent, especially where there are feelings that 
‘indigenous’ populations are targeted disproportionately. Political parties and 
organisations close to the far right or neo-Nazi spectrum have tried to exploit 
such sentiments. ‘Globalisation’ is portrayed as the erosion of national-
 (6) See for example Thomas grumKe & Andreas Klaerner, Rechtsextremismus, 
die soziale Frage und Globalisierungskritik: eine vergleichende Studie zu Deutschland 
und Großbritannien seit 1990, Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2006; Armin pfahl-
Traughber, “Globalisierung als Agitationsthema des organisierten Rechtsextremismus in 
Deutschland”, in T. grumKe & T. greven, eds., Globalisierter Rechtsextremismus?, op. 
cit., p. 30-51; Christina S. lIang, “‘Nationalism Ensures Peace’: the Foreign and Security 
Policy of the German Populist Radical Right after (Re)unification”, in Christina S. lIang, 
ed., Europe for the Europeans, op. cit., p. 139-175; Bernd Sommer, “Anti-Capitalism in the 
Name of Ethno-Nationalism: Ideological Shifts on the German Extreme Right”, in Patterns 
of Prejudice, vol. 42, 2008, p. 305-316; Roger woodS, Germany’s New Right as Culture 
and Politics, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
 (7) See for example Bernd Sommer, “Anti-Capitalism”, op. cit., p. 305-16; Dwayne 
woodS, “Pockets of Resistance to Globalization: the Case of the Lega Nord”, in Patterns 
of Prejudice, vol. 43, 2009, p. 161-177.
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cultural values and as an attack against the achievements of the European 
social model of the welfare state. In much of extreme nationalist thought, the 
‘economy’ is not seen as an autonomous entity but is supposed to serve the 
national populace (8).
Extreme nationalism is far from constituting a homogenous ideology. 
Much disagreement exists between groups, parties or individuals. Conflict 
also prevails between different national organisations or movements. The 
following short exposé of German neo-Nazi ideology thus by no means covers 
the various positions in their entirety. Instead it focuses on those ideological 
manifestations that are directed against ‘globalisation’ or ‘capitalism’ per 
se. Even here, one might distinguish between an anti-globalisation critique 
(mainly voiced by organisations and political parties which aim to appear 
respectable, democratic and ‘close to the people’) and an ‘anti-capitalist’ 
critique (as expressed by the more radical spectrum of the various neo-Nazi 
movements) as their proponents can sometimes stand in antagonism to each 
other (9). On the other hand, recent co-operation between political parties and 
movement organisations has led to some significant overlap of efforts (10).
In Germany, anti-globalisation arguments are increasingly found in 
established far right and nationalist parties and organisations. At times this can 
be explained by the changeover in leadership of those groups. Beginning in the 
1970s, neo-Nazis have now almost entirely replaced the ‘old-Nazi’ cadres as 
group-leaders. This is certainly so in the case of the most prominent German 
far right party, the National Democratic Party (npd). It understands itself as 
leading at once a “battle for the streets” and a “battle for the parliaments” (11) 
referring explicitly to globalisation and capitalism: “The npd decidedly 
rejects the internationalisation of national economies, which is systematically 
advanced by the capitalist economic order […] The npd also rejects the 
globalisation of the German economy because it has directly led to mass 
unemployment.” Instead the party advocates “a diverse and balanced social 
economy”, which is a “geographically-defined [raumorientiert] economic 
order” (12). Militant neo-Nazi movements have found themselves attracted to 
the npd’s new rhetoric. They interpret National Socialism as the opposition 
to, what they denote as, global capitalism. Global capitalism, in its neo-Nazi 
meaning, represents the attack by the global financial elite on the national 
working classes. Most neo-Nazi ideology does not end with the demand 
for more nation-state intervention and labour opportunities for the national 
working class. Instead, it extends its analysis and solidarity to encompass the 
‘universal right’ of self-determination for ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’ worldwide, 
which goes hand in hand with the repression of ‘foreigners’, and often 
 (8) Peter davIeS & Derek lynch, The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far 
Right, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 139-150.
 (9) Wolfram SIede, “Machtgerangel unter Neonazis”, in Junge Welt, 23 February 2005.
 (10) Lars renSmann, “From High Hopes to On-Going Defeat: The New Extreme 
Right’s Political Mobilization and its National Electoral Failure in Germany”, in German 
Politics & Society, vol. 24, 2006, p. 67-92.
 (11)  T. grumKe & A. Klaerner, Rechtsextremismus, die soziale Frage und 
Globalisierungskritik, op. cit., p. 34.
 (12) Quoted in A. pfahl-Traughber, “Globalisierung als Agitationsthema”, op. cit., 
p. 34.
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Jews (13). In Germany and some other European countries, we can witness 
the (re-)emergence of a self-proclaimed ‘national-revolutionary’ movement, 
which has helped to put renewed emphasis on ‘social-revolutionary’ politics 
in some neo-Nazi scenes (14). German militant neo-Nazis are often organised 
in so called Freie Kameradschaften (free fellowships). It is here that an ‘anti-
capitalist’ self-understanding can most clearly be found. It can be traced back 
to the ‘left wing’ of Hitler’s nSdap party and in particular to the ideas of 
Gregor and Otto Strasser and to the leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm. From the 
‘national-revolutionary’ perspective, those men formed part of a revolutionary, 
‘anti-capitalist’ wing within the nSdap, with the aim to replace a class-based 
society with a socialist and culturalist (völkisch) economic system (15).
Good examples for the renewed interest from the extreme right for the 
social question are the mobilisations for ‘Mayday’ or ‘Labour Day’. What is 
seen by the left as a day for international solidarity with the working classes 
of all countries is an event of solidarity with the national working class for 
the right. Neo-Nazis and far right groups celebrate ‘their’ Labour Day with 
references to social topics. In Germany in 2007, six Mayday events were 
advertised by the npd (16). The chosen mottos for the demonstrations sounded 
rather radical: “Together against capitalism! Come out on May 1st!”, “Future 
not globalisation”, “Free people not free markets”, and “Work for millions 
not profits for millionaires”. Sometimes, the openly pronounced racism of the 
past decades all but disappears from the slogans on banners, placards, and 
flyers. In its place appears a concern for the degradation of morals, for work 
and social equality, and for the values of people (Volk) and nation. This is not 
unique to Germany. In France for example, the Front National mobilised for 
its traditional march on 9 May to remind its activists of “all the deaths caused 
by Yankee imperialist wars all over the world for 50 years” (17).
In 2007, ‘national revolutionaries’ and the npd also demonstrated together 
in Frankfurt, the “city of the banks and the stock exchange, the international 
high finance and ‘the Global Players’”, to give voice to its “anti-capitalist” 
politics (18). Frankfurt, they proclaimed in the English translation of their call 
was “a perfect place for this demonstration”:
“At the stock exchange billion-gains are obtained and just a few hundred 
meters away from there homeless Germans die on the street. Many people 
in Frankfurt live on social wellfare [sic] and how shall they find work 
when the labour marked is flooded by low-wages workers?
Against the antisocial system of ‘free’-market economy we set the principe 
[sic] of the national economy, which does not serve the profits of the 
 (13) See for example C.S. lIang, “Nationalism Ensures Peace”, op. cit., p. 139-75.
 (14) See for example Anonymous, “Aktionsbündnisse für den ‘Kampf um die Straße’: 
Konzept und Struktur der ‘Freien Kameradschaften’”, in Antifaschistisches Infoblatt, 52, 
Spring 2001.
 (15) See for example P. davIeS & D. lynch, The Routledge, op. cit., p. 139-150; 
Ingrid SKrypIeTz, “Militant Right-Wing Extremism in Germany”, in German Politics, vol. 
3, 1994, p. 133-40.
 (16) Jan langeheIn, “Ein Globus, viele Völker”, in Jungle World, 28 February 2007.
 (17) Agir, “Lorsque l’esprit se souvient, la flamme se maintient”, in Agir, March/April 
2007, p. 3.
 (18) npd Hessen, “Invitation for an Anti-Capitalistic Demonstration”, http://www.
arbeit-statt-dividende.de (4 April 2010).
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millionaires, but for the welth [sic] and the satisfaction of requirements 
for our people”.
Shielded from anti-fascist protesters by thousands of police officers, a few 
hundred Neo-Nazis thus marched through Frankfurt with the motto “Work 
not dividends”. Such mobilisations see ‘capitalism’ as its enemy, and the 
enemy of all ‘peoples’. Capitalism is described as profit-driven and nomadic, 
manifesting itself in “banks, stock exchanges and speculation funds” (19). 
Political conspiracies and finance capitalists are accused of forcing a world 
market onto all national economies and communities. The ‘anti-capitalist’ 
campaign ‘Future not Globalisation’ states:
“Even if the ruling politicians and the representatives of big money will 
tell you the opposite, capitalism and globalisation lead to masses of losers 
and only small groups of winners. The losers are entire peoples [sic] 
and the winners are speculators, corporate bosses, bankers and corrupt 
politicians.
The only effective socialist weapon against international capital is its 
counter-principle of nationalism – structuring, rooted and linked to 
home and people. Nationalism fights against the capitalist degradation of 
human beings with its own idea of social order: the national community 
[Volksgemeinschaft]”.
On the one hand, here, the anti-globalisation focus of the extreme 
nationalist right is opportunist. It is not difficult to imagine how the 
foreshortened (20), ‘anti-capitalist’ criticism made by the far right of ‘Jewish 
finance capital’ and globalisation processes can be tied to a notion of national 
belonging. Most right-wing anti-globalisation rhetoric celebrates nationhood 
as a model to defeat the effects of ‘globalism’. At a time where progressive 
responses to globalisation from left-wing new social movements have 
received increasing public attention, the far right seeks to occupy this terrain 
with its own perspective. On the other hand, however, an exclusive focus on 
political opportunity structures cannot show the whole picture of extreme 
nationalism as a social movement. For a start, of course, the attention to the 
social question is not new. We might only think of the corporatism of the 
‘old’ fascism or the ‘querfront’ strategies during the Weimar Republic (21). 
One would be misled, therefore, to regard the extreme nationalist adoption of 
anti-globalisation rhetoric as a simple attempt at imitation. It might be true 
that the themes of social reforms and capitalism are being used strategically 
in areas where traditional racism and prejudices have little appeal. This does 
 (19) Zukunft statt Globalisierung, “Aufruf ”, http://www.antikap.de/?antikap=aufruf (4 
April 2009).
 (20) See Moishe poSTone, “Anti-Semitism and National Socialism”, in Anson 
rabInbach & Jack zIpeS, eds., Germans and Jews since the Holocaust: The Changing 
Situation in West Germany, London, Holmes and Meier, 1986, p. 302-314.
 (21) For example, Timothy S. brown, “Richard Scheringer, the Kpd and the Politics of 
Class and Nation in Germany, 1922-1969”, in Contemporary European History, vol. 14, 2005, 
p. 317-346; Otto-Ernst SchueddeKopf, Linke Leute von Rechts: die nationalrevolutionären 
Minderheiten und der Kommunismus in Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer Verlag, 
1960.
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not preclude, however, that the significance of a ‘critique of capitalism’ for 
neo-Nazis is real (22). 
Where contemporary far right movements equate globalisation with 
‘American cultural imperialism’, the obvious counter-force is ‘Europe’. On 
an increasing number of neo-Nazi mobilisations, for instance, slogans and 
banners that evoke a ‘spirit of Europe’ can be found, alongside ideas that 
stress the ‘common destiny’ of the ‘European peoples’. While pan-European 
fascism is certainly not new, as we will see, it is interesting to note how it is 
now linked to ‘anti-capitalism’ and ‘third position’ ideology.
The origins of nationalist Europeanism
The longing for the (re-)discovery of an imagined, authentic Europe 
is no recent phenomenon. Gerard Delanty traces its intellectual roots in 
an earlier era of what he calls “European pessimism” (23). In the political, 
legal and literary texts of the European intelligentsia he detects a pessimist 
and decadent Zeitgeist that attempted to “rescue the idea of Europe from 
the nihilism of modernity” (24) and really marked a European identity. 
Sometimes, the pessimistic view of European civilisation was based upon an 
intellectual anti-Modernism and the romanticism of the post-Enlightenment 
era. As Delanty puts it, the European pessimism was “a return to a 
supposedly authentic European culture as a substitute for the intellectual 
void of modernity and technological civilization” (25). Delanty also stresses 
the European dimension of the feeling of European degeneration. According 
to him, the Catholic writings of Ortega y Gasset were concerned with the 
tradition of the ‘European spirit’, just as were the critiques of mass society by 
Emile Durkheim or T.S. Eliot, the cultural pessimism of Friedrich Nietzsche, 
or the works of Heidegger and Carl Schmitt.
The European pessimism that Delanty describes came to its culmination 
in Weimar Germany in the intellectual movement of the Conservative 
Revolution (26). Here the antagonistic themes of culture and civilisation were 
really played out to achieve political force. The Conservative Revolution 
movement refers to the circles of intellectuals in post-World War I Germany, 
who argued for a cultural and political revolution against both communism 
and liberalism, with the aim of a unified Volksgemeinschaft, or peoples’ 
 (22) Ursula meyer, “Rechts, Links… alles der gleiche Sumpf?”, in Top Berlin, ed., 
Nationaler Sozialismus: ‘Antikapitalismus’ von völkischen Freaks, Berlin, Rosa Luxemburg 
Stiftung, 2007, p. 6-9 (http://top-berlin.net).
 (23) Gerard delanTy, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 109-111.
 (24) G. delanTy, Inventing Europe, op. cit., p. 110.
 (25) G. delanTy, Inventing Europe, op. cit., p. 110.
 (26) See for example Stefan breuer, Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution, 
Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993; Armin pfahl-Traughber, 
Konservative Revolution und Neue Rechte: Rechtsextremistische Intellektuelle gegen den 
demokratischen Verfassungsstaat, Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 1998; Rold P. SIeferle, Die 
Konservative Revolution: Fünf biographische Skizzen, Frankfurt, Fischer Taschenbuch, 
1995; Roger woodS, The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic, New York, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1996.
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community. They were right-wing and conservative political agitators and 
writers who often had little more in common than their disquiet or outright 
hostility to the Weimar Republic, which for them represented the decline 
of German culture, disorder and chaos. Many voiced their opposition 
through authoritarianism and radical nationalism and a chauvinistic desire 
for a clear social hierarchy. As such their works influenced various political 
manifestations of fascism and were an undeniable precursor, albeit an uneasy 
one, to the ideologies of the Third Reich. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the 
Conservative Revolution movement had thus emerged as a very heterogeneous 
assemblage of right-wing ideologies and intellectuals.
Nonetheless there were some common features. The glorification of 
culture and the disgust for civilisation became one of those themes. For 
Oswald Spengler, who with his 1918 book The Decline of the West set the 
tone for the Conservative Revolution movement, civilisation was “the most 
external and artificial state of which humanity is capable” (27). Civilisation, 
for Spengler, was devoid of soul and spirit, essential ingredients to healthy 
and functioning social organisms. Moreover, civilisation was destructive, 
having taken the place of culture as its ‘corpse’. Similarly, with his argument 
for compatibility of German socialism and authoritarian leadership, Arthur 
Möller van den Bruck, who Mosse calls “the prophet of the ‘third way’” (28), 
also influenced later National Socialism. He advocated a German socialism, 
which was to unite a corporate social order with the spirit of the German 
Volk. This had nothing in common with Marxist socialism but was explicitly 
defined against its materialism and internationalism as in his assertion that 
“every people has its own socialism” (29). Social, economic and even racial-
biological factors should not stand in the way of the true realisation of the 
German Volk. Rather, Möller van den Bruck’s conservative revolutionary 
perspective of ‘The Third Reich’ was one of an ideological and spiritual 
revolution. 
Contemporary proponents of conservative revolutionary ideas, such as 
Armin Mohler, did not see a contradiction in terms (30). The Conservative 
Revolution was conservative because of its basis in tradition and romanticism 
and its belief in the organic unity of the nation or Volk. But it was also 
revolutionary because it wanted to do away with bourgeois and liberal society 
and provided an attack on finance and speculative capitalism. It expressed 
the idea that a reformist attitude towards preserving tradition and culture was 
impossible; revolution was needed. At its heart, the Conservative Revolution 
was a reaction to a perceived crisis of social modernisation and industrialism. 
As such, Mohler identifies Nietzsche as one of the central figures to influence 
the movement (31). Nietzsche described the self-destruction of the Western 
World and questioned the linearity of progressive thinking with his idea 
 (27) Quoted in George L. moSSe, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins 
of the Third Reich, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964, p. 6.
 (28) G.L. moSSe, The Crisis of German Ideology, op. cit., p. 281.
 (29) Quoted in G.L. moSSe, The Crisis of German Ideology, op. cit., p. 281.
 (30) Armin mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932: ein 
Handbuch, Second edition, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972.
 (31) A. mohler, Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932, op. cit., p. 
86-90.
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of ‘return’. The revolutionary conservatism that Mohler also subscribed 
to was strictly anti-materialist, rejecting the class-based analyses of social 
fragmentation. It upheld instead the values of an organic whole, the nation 
as a ‘Volkisch’ conception of social cohesion.
The most significant feature of the Conservative Revolution movement’s 
relationship to Europe was its self-understanding as a ‘third way’ or ‘third 
path’ movement set in opposition to both liberalism and communism (32). 
There is thus a strong overlap with the national revolutionary agenda that 
would emerge on the ‘Strasser-wing’ on the left of the nSdap. Both were 
challenges to Hitler that came to an end with the persecution and purges 
of ‘reactionaries’ by Hitler in the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ in 1934 (33). 
Importantly, the ‘third way’ is essentially European, referring to a European 
spirit that is set against the two opposing ideologies of West and East and 
is able to do justice to the authentic character of European identity. The 
movement’s European elements are also found in similar conceptions of 
European culture by intellectuals of the continent, amongst them George 
Sorel, Julius Evola, Vilfredo Pareto or Charles Maurras. Within Europe, 
however, Germany would take the dominant role of influence. In fact, the 
Conservative Revolution is inseparable from the era of the Weimar Republic. 
After the defeat in World War I and the perceived humiliation of the treaty 
of Versailles, the Weimar Republic epitomised the decline of the West. The 
Bolshevik revolution, on the other hand, was seen as a tangible threat from 
the East. The ‘new’ Germany would have to be conceived as a force strong 
and confident enough to restore a ‘natural’ social order to the whole continent.
Despite the purges of 1934, National Socialism and fascism continued to 
be influenced by a ‘third way’ European dimension. While fascism was based 
on the concept of the nation, it was also a project that attempted to revive 
the European spirit to create a new Europe. For Delanty, fascism was directly 
linked to the European Idea: 
“It was the dream of all fascists from Mosley via Mussolini to Hitler 
to create a truly European supra-national civilisation. […] To this end, 
the idea of the ‘New Europe’ was an aesthetic fiction for a future fascist 
Europe. Fascism was compatible with the European ideal. […] In 
fact, fascist ideology can even be seen as the apotheosis of the idea of 
Europe” (34).
 (32) Another notion of a ‘third path’ was the then popular concept of Mitteleuropa, 
constructed against both Western liberalism and Eastern communism. On the one hand, 
Mitteleuropa is connected to negative imperial notions of a pan-German empire and finally 
attempted politically by the Third Reich. On the other hand, others have argued for a more 
positive history of the concept as a unifying meaning for a multi-ethnic region with Austro-
Hungarian spirit. See Patricia chIanTere-STuTTe, “Space, Großraum and Mitteleuropa in 
Some Debates of the Early Twentieth Century”, in European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 
11, 2008, p. 185-201.
 (33) Hitler’s purge of 1934 was mainly directed against the prominent leaders of the Sa. 
However, also non-military proponents of the Conservative Revolution were arrested and 
killed. Amongst them was Edgar Julius Jung, one of the most influential radical conservative 
critics of the National Socialist mass movement.
 (34) G. delanTy, Inventing Europe, op. cit., p. 112.
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Also in Mark Mazower’s study, Dark Continent, fascism in general and 
German National Socialism in particular are described as ideologies with 
strong Eurocentric character: “National Socialism, in particular, fits into 
the mainstream not only of German but also of European history far more 
comfortably than most people like to admit” (35).
While the line of National Socialist thought can be traced back to German 
romanticism and the Conservative Revolution, there are significant differences 
nonetheless. The anti-modern and anti-progressive element that characterised 
the Conservative Revolution is less influential. In its place emerged a violent 
anti-Semitism as the defining characteristic of the Third Reich. And of course, 
after the Strasser-faction on the left of the nSdap was largely eliminated 
after 1934, the party was ready to accept a politics that was more reformist 
than that of the national-revolutionaries and less conservative than that of 
the proponents of radical conservatism. A remaining feature was, albeit 
subordinated to anti-Semitism and to the military effort, the search for a third 
path between Marxism and liberal capitalism. Moreover, the location for 
this third path ideology remained the political and cultural space of Europe. 
As Mark Mazower puts it, “Fascism, after all, was the most Eurocentric of 
the three major ideologies, far more so than either communism or liberal 
democracy: a creed that was both anti-American and anti-Bolshevik” (36). 
And he concludes:
“A self-belief rooted in Christianity, capitalism, the Enlightenment and 
massive technological superiority encouraged Europeans to see themselves 
over a long period as a civilizational model for the globe. Their trust 
in Europe’s world mission was already evident in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and reached its apogee in the era of imperialism. 
Hitler was in many ways its culminating figure and through the Nazi New 
Order came closer to its realization than anyone else” (37).
The fascist idea of European unity, while lacking the German romanticist 
history, had early on found strong support in parts of the British fascist 
movement, and mainly in its figurehead Oswald Mosley. Mosley is best 
known for founding and leading the British Union of Fascists. It was in the 
circles around the buf that the ‘Europe a Nation’ idea sparked considerable 
interest. A Conservative MP and then Fabian socialist in his early political 
years, Mosley founded the New Party in 1931. The New Party was based on 
Mosley’s corporate economic policies designed to meet the crisis of the Great 
Depression. The Party became increasingly fascistic until, in 1932, Mosley 
united it with other British fascist organisations to form the anti-communist 
and protectionist British Union of Fascists.
As early as 1936 (in an essay published as The World Alternative (38)) 
and especially with the beginning of the war, Mosley began promoting a 
 (35) Mark mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, New York, Vintage 
Books, 1998, p. xII.
 (36) M. mazower, Dark Continent, op. cit., p. xIv.
 (37) m. mazower, Dark Continent, op. cit., p. 405.
 (38) See Roger grIffIn, “‘Europe for the Europeans’: Fascist Myths of the European 
New Order 1922-1992”, in Matthew feldman, ed., A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger 
Griffin, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2008, p. 248.
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European peace settlement based on sovereignty and independence for the 
major European powers. After the war, he continued to argue for the idea 
‘Europe a Nation’ that would be able to transcend hostility between European 
states through a pan-European fascist movement, which he called ‘European 
Socialism’ (39). Mosley’s new party, the Union Movement, moved away from 
a narrowly defined nationalism towards embracing a fascistic conception 
of European unity. Here, Mosley argued that only a strong unified Europe 
could act as a counterbalance to the two superpowers, the uSSr and the uSa. 
The buf and the Union Movement were not only anti-communist and anti-
American, but deeply anti-Semitic. Both Bolshevik communism and uS-style 
capitalism could be demonised as Jewish conspiracies. Dave Renton shows 
how a number of fascist texts of the time combined anti-Jewish and anti-
finance elements:
“What was wrong with capital, according to the fascists, was its links 
with the worlds of finance. They argued that finance was usury and that 
usury was, in the Duke of Bedford’s phrase, ‘what the modern Jew has 
successfully taught the world’. If only the financiers could be liquidated 
in the interests of industry, then all would be well.  […] Fascist attacks 
on finance were predicated on absolute support for industrial capital” (40).
Hoping that this anti-finance, anti-Semitic theme could unite European 
fascist parties, Mosley attempted a number of pan-European initiatives, with 
the Italian Social Movement (mSI), the Spanish Falange and the Belgian 
Jeune Europe as some of the main partners. The ‘European Social Movement’ 
was based largely on the Italian mSI model and functioned as an alliance of 
European neo-fascist parties. It was superseded by the ‘National Party of 
Europe’, which provided a more concrete and organised platform, in which 
Mosley also took at lead role (41). 
Independent from Mosley’s efforts after the war, a small group of British 
fascists emerged from the British Union of Fascists that shared Mosley’s 
focus on Europe, but chose different tactics to advance the idea. In 1948, 
they founded the European Liberation Front as an organisation that would 
attempt to introduce the European idea into the circles of fascist elites. The 
short-lived group was based around the American Francis Parker Yockey, 
who in his book Imperium had argued for the abandonment of nation-state 
thinking in favour of a pan-European approach. He had come into conflict 
with Mosley however over the question of the United States. For Mosley, the 
Soviet Union remained the main enemy for fascists in Europe, while Yockey 
argued that the United States had to be taken seriously as Europe’s prime 
competitor. Yockey also placed emphasis on a cultural reading of nationhood, 
and rejected the concept of race (42). The European Liberation Front would 
later develop a more National Bolshevik tendency.
 (39) See R. grIffIn, “‘Europe for the Europeans’”, op. cit.; Oswald moSley, 
“European Socialism”, in The European, May 1956.
 (40) Dave renTon, “Was Fascism an Ideology? British Fascism Reconsidered”, in 
Race & Class, vol. 41, 2000, p. 78-79.
 (41) R. grIffIn, “‘Europe for the Europeans’”, op. cit., p. 248.
 (42) Keith coogan, “Lost Imperium: The European Liberation Front (1949-54)”, in 
Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 36, 2002, p. 9-23.
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Mosley’s and Yockey’s ideas fit seamlessly into the history not only of a 
romantic, conservative and fascistic Europeanism, but also into a tendency 
of far right thought that stresses its European ‘third position’ in between the 
communism of the Soviet Union and the capitalist liberalism of the United 
States. As such, the extreme nationalist notion of Europe has been linked 
to revolutionary ideas that were both anti-materialist and anti-liberal. The 
‘third position’ was certainly nationalist, though this did not preclude the 
conceptualisation of a supra-national entity adopting the meaning of ‘Europe 
a Nation’. Finally, the role that Europe would assume was perceived as a 
return to, or reawakening of, a supposedly authentic and natural culture, freed 
of the corrupting influence of modern civilisation.
Contemporary European nationalist movements
Since 1945, there have been renewed attempts to bring together various 
nationalist and extreme right parties and organisations across nation-
states. The intellectual effort is often characterised by a reconstruction of 
‘Europe’ as the central idea of Aryan mythology; sometimes as a defensive 
conceptualisation to protect the values of Christianity, and sometimes as an 
offensive programme of liberation from both Bolshevik attacks and capitalist 
rule, seeing itself as engaging in a battle for the continental liberation from 
political and cultural colonisation. Conservative Revolutionary ideas continue 
to inspire the political action of contemporary intellectual nationalists (such 
as the Nouvelle Droite) as well as far right social movements. In terms of 
social movement mobilisation, the German neo-Nazi scene serves again as 
a prism through which to discern the impact of Europeanist ideology on 
transnational organisation within extreme nationalist movements. In this 
section I briefly give the examples of the Fest der Völker and of the Rudolf 
Hess marches.
The Fest der Völker (Festival of the Peoples), subtitled ‘For a Europe of 
Nations’, has been held in the East German state of Thuringia since 2005. 
The event features right-wing extremist rock bands from all over Europe, 
mainly from the Blood and Honour network, and is advertised through 
Europe-wide networks. Speakers are representatives and leaders of far right 
parties from a number of European countries, some of whom work together 
in the European National Front (43). Banners advocate the unity of European 
peoples, such as “Europe awake – brothers in arms of Europe in the alliance 
for freedom” (44). The website boasts slogans such as “We are Europe!” or 
“Europe will live or go down with us!” (45). Fest der Völker was the title of 
a Leni Riefenstahl film about the Berlin Olympic Games. It thus puts the 
 (43) The enf is a co-ordinating platform for European far right parties, which tend to 
subscribe to a Third Positionist ideology.
 (44) Holger KulIcK & Gabriele nandlInger, “‘Europe awake’: Europas Neonazis 
mobilisieren mit Rechtsrock nach Jena”, in Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: 
Rechtsextremismus, 2007, http://www.bpb.de/themen/VXX3WN,0,0,Europe_awake.htm (2 
April 2010).
 (45) Fest der Völker, “Festival website”, 2008, http://www.n-w-j.de/festdervoelker (2 
April 2010).
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festival in the tradition of Nazi mass events in the Third Reich and makes 
a direct reference to National Socialism. The festival is organised by the 
npd (46) and the Freie Kameradschaft (47) scene with some thousand neo-
Nazis taking part annually. Politically, the festival calls for the acceptance 
of ethno-pluralism in the European skinhead and neo-Nazi movement. The 
website call for the first festival reads:
“Nationalists are not xenophobic [...], we esteem every culture and every 
man and woman. Yet, we are of the opinion that every man and woman 
and every culture have their ancestral place in this world, and everyone 
should respect that” (48).
The event has a strong ‘international’ character, with parts of the website 
being translated into fifteen European languages. This European focus marks 
the special character of the event. The festival’s motto and its transnational 
outlook demonstrate the attempt by the European far right to move beyond 
co-operation towards a pan-Europeanist discourse. 
The website for the 2010 festival (which was cancelled due to organisational 
issues, as well as opposition by the local authorities) states that future festivals 
will happen over two days and provide more room for international exchange: 
“There shall be better possibilities to strike up conversations with comrades 
[Kameraden] from other European states” (49). Practically, it is especially 
through the international dimension of the Blood and Honour music network 
that the festival can reach a European-wide audience. On the network’s online 
discussion forum there are sections where, for example, Hungarian, Russian, 
Greek, and Swiss neo-Nazis discuss the festival. Strong connections also exist 
between the festival organisers and Blood and Honour sections from Italy (50). 
Many in the crowd are clearly attracted by an international line-up of fascist 
rock bands, such as the Slovenian ‘Before the War’, the Czech ‘Conflict’, 
the Dutch ‘Brigade M’, or the British ‘Brutal Attack’. Just as with the music 
bookings, the range of parties and political organisations represented at the 
Fest der Völker tells of its transnational ambitions. Apart from the leader of 
the German npd, Udo Voigt, speakers at the event have included delegates 
from neo-Nazi organisation from over a dozen European countries, including 
regularly from England, Holland, Austria, Italy, Romania and Hungary. Many 
tend to come from East and Central European countries (due to the close 
proximity of the festival’s East German location), such as party and movement 
 (46) The npd is currently the most prominent German far right party. In the words of 
Liang, it “has developed a coherent foreign political vision in which Germany will lead 
in a Europe of nations, free from the domination of the United States, from the economic 
vicissitudes of economic globalization, and resolute in the face of danger from Muslim 
extremists and asylum seekers” (C.S. lIang, Europe for the Europeans, op. cit., p. 139).
 (47) The Freie Kameradschaften, or ‘free fellowships’ are organizations of Germany’s 
militant neo-Nazi scene, which are locally organized but often affiliated to loose regional 
networks.
 (48) Quoted in Hannes gIeSSler, “Fest der Völker, Karneval der Kulturen”, in Conne 
Island News Flyer, 122, 2005, http://www.conne-island.de/nf/122/3.html (4 April 2010).
 (49) Fest der Völker, “Festival website”, entry from 1 September 2010, http://www.n-
w-j.de/festdervoelker/ .
 (50) Max bauer, “Hintergründe zum ‘Fest der Völker’ und ‘Blood & Honour’”, 
Indymedia Germany, 2008, http://de.indymedia.org/2008/09/226259.shtml (6 April 2010).
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leaders from the Romanian Noua Dreapta, the Bulgarian Nationalist Union, 
from Czech and Slovakian ultra-nationalist groups, the Greek Golden Dawn, 
and high-ranking activists from Blood and Honour in the region. There are 
also frequent visits by representatives from Western and Northern Europe, 
especially from the Netherlands and Scandinavia.
Despite the participation by high-profile music groups and political 
representatives from across the continent, the rank-and-file mobilisation to 
the festival has been less international in character. In large parts this is 
certainly due to the insecure arrangements and last-minute (re-)organisation 
that the event has become associated with. Confronted with pressure by local 
authorities and protest from anti-fascist and civil society groups, the event 
has had to sporadically change locations or even be cancelled altogether. 
Audience members and participants are therefore largely drawn from the 
region, including Eastern Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Austria. 
In 2005, despite the wide mobilisation across Europe and an expected 1,500 
participants, only around half that number attended. By 2007, this had 
increased to up to 2,000. In subsequent years, local authorities warned of 
several thousand neo-Nazis from across Europe, yet those numbers have not 
been attained.
Ideologically, the festival has tried to make connections to the neo-Nazi 
anti-globalisation campaigns (51). The speakers, campaigns and political 
content of the festival make strong references to the anti-capitalist and anti-
globalisation campaigns of some German neo-Nazi organisations. They 
criticise the capitalist system for its globalising trends. In opposition they 
tout their version of “national socialism”. The festival organisers oppose the 
“parasitic [volksfremd] and ubiquitous [raumlos] capitalist ideology”, which 
they describe as alienated from the people and without grounding in a concrete 
national setting. Instead, they posit a Europe of “sovereign nation-states”, 
nationally-defined economies [raumorientierte nationale Volkswirtschaften] 
and cultural autarky. Further, the festival call proclaims: “We are Europe!: 
The policies of the globalists push the interests of the European peoples 
further into the background.” (idem). The call also accuses the Brussels 
‘Eurocrats’ of turning Europeans into nomadic slaves without allegiance 
to homeland, culture or family. It entails a mix of classic scaremongering 
of mass immigration and race riots coupled with foreshortened critiques of 
capitalism and Americanisation. Particularly, the rhetoric of a degradation 
of values and culture is an attempt to make the connection between extreme 
right ideology and the conservative centre via New Right concepts. The call 
finally proclaims: “That is what we oppose! The globalists haven’t taken us 
and the peoples [Völker] into account. With the advancement of the uprooting 
and commodification of the peoples and people also comes a growing and 
healthy nationalism…”. The Europe of nation-states is heralded as a model 
for co-operation to defend the continent from multiculturalism: “The future 
speaks the language of the peoples [Völker], and not the language of ‘One 
World’! Europe shall live or shall die with us!”  (52).
 (51) aSj Jena, “10.06.06 Jena: Operation Voelkerball”, Indymedia Germany, 2006, 
http://de.indymedia.org/2006/05/147507.shtml (2 April 2010).
 (52) Quoted in aSj Jena, 10.06.06 Jena, op. cit.
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Of course there have been massive counter protests against the festival (53). 
In 2005, street blockades by anti-fascists led to the festival being held on 
a car park outside Jena rather than in the city centre. At the same time, 
8,000 people held a protest march against the right-wing festival. In 2006, 
the festival was completely shut down; not by anti-fascist protest however. 
In the wake of the football World Cup being held in Germany, the town of 
Jena saw itself incapable of diverting police resources to the festival and 
counter protests and banned any political event to take place. In 2007, 1,500 
supporters of the far right attempted to reach the festival ground in Jena. 
They were stopped by protests and blockades by 3,000 anti-fascists. It took 
police three hours to lift the blockades and ensure that the festival could take 
place with delay. In 2008, the anti-fascist alliance against the festival could 
register two successes in the weeks leading up to it. The public announcement 
of blockades of those trying to reach the festival site led the npd organisers 
to change the venue from the town of Jena to the smaller town of Altenburg. 
Also, it was found that the international Blood and Honour online forum 
could be hacked, and internal data could be made public. Anti-fascists were 
hoping that this information could contribute to the proof of a continuing 
existence of a Blood and Honour section in Germany (which was forbidden 
in 2000) and of a link to the Fest der Völker. An anti-fascist alliance in 
Altenburg was unable to blockade the festival, but managed to delay the 
arrival of most of its participants for two hours (54).
Despite resistance from both radical anti-fascist groups and civil society 
actors, the German neo-Nazi scene continues to organise large-scale events, 
some of them with European significance, aimed at building a shared identity 
and cultural understanding in the far right movement. Liang also notes that 
the “perceived common identity with other European populist radical right 
parties has led German far right groups to invest considerable energy into 
creating a pan-European network” (55). She identifies the attempt to build 
common markers such as ethno-pluralism, anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism 
and Islamophobia as the far right’s basis for a ‘Europe for the Europeans’.
The annual commemoration of Rudolf Hess’ death is a further event that 
attracts European neo-Nazis and neo-fascists to Germany. Hess was a leading 
nSdap politician and deputy to Adolf Hitler. He was prosecuted and convicted 
by the international military tribunal in Nuremberg and subsequently 
sentenced to life in prison, where he committed suicide 1987. Hess’s death 
has given rise to a number of conspiracy theories as to its cause. In the 
official version he hanged himself in the prison’s gardens, although members 
of his family believe he was murdered by the British Secret Intelligence 
Service. In right-wing extremist circles this has elevated him to the status 
of a martyr. He has also become a figurehead of the contemporary neo-Nazi 
movement because he had never shown remorse for his role in the nSdap 
and the Holocaust. Significantly, the Hess myth is able to rally together large 
parts of the European far Right and white nationalists for coordinated action. 
 (53) m. bauer, “Hintergründe zum ‘Fest der Völker’ und ‘Blood & Honour’”, op. cit.
 (54) Aktionsnetzwerk Jena, “Nazi-Fest in Altenburg drei Stunden blockiert”, 2008, 
http://www.aktionsnetzwerk.de/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102
&Itemid=20 (2 April 2010).
 (55) C. S. lIang, “Nationalism Ensures Peace”, op. cit., p. 166.
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They commemorate his attempt to foster a European (Anglo-German) peace 
agreement as early as 1941 that would be based upon the co-operation and 
understanding of European white races. In 1941, Hess flew to Scotland to 
meet with Douglas Douglas-Hamilton, who he thought to be the leader of the 
British peace movement. Instead, Hess was taken into British custody as a 
prisoner of war. It is assumed that Hess had planned (with or without Hitler’s 
knowledge) to enter peace negotiations with Britain to avoid a war that he 
termed “suicidal for the white race” (56). 
Since the first anniversary of Hess’ death in 1988, the ‘Rudolf Hess memorial 
march’ has attracted European neo-Nazis to the small town of Wunsiedel 
where Hess is buried. From 1991 to 2000 however, the demonstrations were 
not allowed to take place in Wunsiedel and were carried out in other German 
towns as well as neighbouring countries such as the Netherlands, Luxemburg 
and Denmark. In the early 2000s the authorised marches achieved participant 
numbers well into the thousands and thus counted among the largest neo-Nazi 
demonstrations in Europe, attracting neo-Nazis from across the continent. 
Already days after Hess’ death in 1987, neo-Nazis came to Wunsiedel to 
take part in the funeral, which they were prevented from joining by the 
authorities. From 1988 onwards the authorised marches grew in numbers 
drawing from both neo-Nazis and ‘old’-Nazi cadres, including participants 
from other European countries. By 1990, the number of demonstrators had 
already increased to over 1,500. That year was also marked by violent clashes 
between participants from the Hess memorial march and autonomous anti-
fascist groups, leading to the prohibition of the march from the following 
year onwards. In 1991 thus, political demonstrations were forbidden for 
Wunsiedel and the surrounding region, forcing the neo-Nazis to protest in 
the town of Bayreuth instead. Three thousand Hess supporters, many from 
across the continent, followed the call to protest against the ban to march in 
Wunsiedel. Until 2001, police bans forced the marches to move to other cities 
and even neighbouring countries, or to hold smaller decentralised memorial 
events. None of those could attract the same numbers of participants as the 
Wunsiedel marches. As a further blow to the mobilisations, on the ten-year 
anniversary of Hess’ death in 1997, nation-wide bans on the commemorations 
were enacted and over 500 neo-Nazis were arrested, resulting in a big decline 
of memorial events in the following three years. March organisers eventually 
had the ban lifted in 2001 and returned to Wunsiedel. This time, anti-fascist 
mobilisations remained weak and thousands of European neo-Nazis came 
together that year and in the following years up until 2005. The numbers of 
participants culminated in 2004 with up to 5,000 neo-Nazis from all over 
Europe. Following the success in 2004 the marches were banned again, 
resulting in a sharp decline in numbers and events.
The transnational dimension is again significant for the Rudolf Hess 
mobilisations. Commemorative events are advertised on websites and 
online forums across Europe and the US. Especially the larger marches in 
Wunsiedel drew participants from outside of Germany. Early on there were 
only a few delegations from Western European countries, such as Austria, 
 (56) Eugene davIdSon, The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty-two 
Defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Columbia, University 
of Missouri Press, 1997.
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Belgium, and the Netherlands. However, already in 1994 and 1995 the first 
commemorative demonstrations were organised in Luxemburg and Denmark 
respectively, partly to escape banning orders in Germany. In the second half 
of the 1990s, organisers resorted to more decentralised action repertoires, 
including smaller, local events, flyposting and graffiti, as well as actions 
against political opponents. Later the large Wunsiedel demonstrations in the 
early 2000s drew increasingly larger numbers of non-German participants. 
Some carried their respective national flags on the marches or displayed 
banners with the group’s name and country flag. They included extreme 
nationalists from as far away as Sweden, Denmark, Russia, Bulgaria, Spain, 
France, Belgium, The Netherlands, England, and Scotland; though more 
participants came from closer places in Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Switzerland, or Italy.
While some of the German organisations provide coaches for their members, 
many of the foreign participants rely on personal travel arrangements by car, 
as the Rudolf Hess march organisers do not publicly arrange convergence or 
sleeping spaces (57). In the last few years, the attempts to march in Wunsiedel 
and other German towns have been hit by bans again, and it seems like the 
ability of the Hess myth to bring together European ‘old-style’ Nazis, neo-
fascists, and militant ultra-nationalists in large-scale mobilisations has ebbed 
somewhat. Nonetheless, decentralised and smaller publicity-seeking actions 
are still carried out every year on the anniversary of Hess’ death; mostly in 
Germany, but also Europe-wide.
The continuing importance of the Rudolf Hess commemorations for the 
European neo-Nazi scene not only points to the power of mobilisation of a 
martyr figure. It also indicates the meaning attached to a personality who, 
despite his national identity as Hitler’s deputy, is perceived as having retained 
a certain degree of integrity and loyalty to the vision of a united fascist 
Europe. The significance of Hess’s persona is not his position in the Nazi 
hierarchy, but his effort to settle for a pan-European solution to German 
aggression. Yet, the marches in Wunsiedel and the decentralised acts of 
commemoration represent a wider trend. Just like the counter-globalisation 
left and the anti-capitalist movements, parts of the neo-Nazi scene use a 
number of annual mass events and symbolic dates to bring together activists 
from across Europe – not only in an attempt to foster co-operation, but also 
to mobilise through a sense of pan-European identity.
Conclusions
I have analyzed contemporary neo-Nazi mobilisations, especially in 
Germany, as a social movement whose ultra-nationalism is nonetheless 
compatible with pan-Europeanism. While race can still be a defining factor in 
extreme nationalist politics, it often takes an ‘ethno-pluralistic’ turn, whereby 
culture, or culturally-defined ethnicity, is seen as the predominant marker of 
 (57) Thomas doerfler & Andreas Klaerner, “Der ‘Rudolf-Heß-Gedenkmarsch’
in Wunsiedel: Rekonstruktion eines nationalistischen Phantasmas”, 2004, http://www.
rechtsextremismusforschung.de/Doerfler-Klaerner_wunsiedel2004.pdf (4 April 2010).
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a community. Advocates of ethno-pluralism have thus argued that European 
nations can equally contribute towards the construction of a European identity.
Origins of extreme nationalist Europeanism can certainly be found in the 
reaction to Enlightenment thought and technological advancement. Europe 
was seen as a potential bulwark against the destructiveness of modernity, 
promising home and community. A common theme running through from 
this ‘European pessimism’ to contemporary far right thought is the reaction 
against ‘civilisation’ in favour of the ‘rediscovery’ of European ‘culture’. This 
was certainly the case in post-1918 Germany, a period and region marked 
by immense economic and social upheaval. An emerging ‘Conservative 
Revolution’ movement responded to the perceived chaos and disorder with 
radical nationalism and the call for the reawakening of an ‘authentic’ European 
order. Sometimes this was accompanied with ‘socialist’ radicalism, marrying 
a longing for authority and stability with the belief that only revolutionary 
change could achieve this. The idea of Europe thus played a central role in 
the ideological precursor to Hitler’s version of National Socialism. The nSdap 
would eventually occupy a position between the nationalist authoritarianism 
of the conservatives and the revolutionary National Bolshevism of Strasser 
and others. Hitler would successfully eliminate both political adversaries 
in the ‘Night of the Long Knives’. The idea of Europe would continue to 
live throughout the Third Reich, however. Moreover, the role of Europe in 
National Socialism was most fervently put forward by Oswald Mosley in 
England during and after the war. 
Two examples of large contemporary neo-Nazi mobilisations are cited in 
this article to investigate how such far right Europeanist ideology manifests 
politically and organisationally. First, the Fest der Völker, a yearly political 
music festival that takes place in Eastern Germany, attracts skinheads, white-
supremacists and neo-Nazis from across Europe. It is explicitly advertised as 
a European festival that sees its audience as a young vanguard of European 
nationalism. Apart from rock music from bands belonging to the ‘Blood and 
Honour’ network, it features speeches from many major far right parties and 
organisations in Europe. Second, the ‘Rudolf Hess marches’ commemorate 
the death of Hitler’s second-in-command. They draw neo-Nazi participants 
from a number of European countries and have become one of the largest 
annual street demonstrations of the far right today, taking place in Germany 
but also in neighbouring countries. Hess is remembered not just for his 
unrepentant ‘martyr’ status amongst young fascists, but also because of his 
attempt to prevent a total war between European nations. The examples also 
show that extreme nationalist political action continues to have a significant 
Europeanist dimension to it. 
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AbstrAct
The Transnationality of European Nationalist Movements
This article investigates the rationale behind transnational mobilisations of neo-Nazi 
and fascist social movements. It argues that pan-Europeanism is a central tenet, not 
a counter-principle, of extreme nationalist thought. The focus of the paper lies on 
contemporary examples of German extra-parliamentary organisations that subscribe 
to an anti-globalist or anti-capitalist ideology, and on their philosophical and 
historical precursors. It analyses those strains of reactionary thought that have aimed 
to ‘preserve’ and ‘reawaken’ a European Spirit or Culture in defence against the 
perceived threats of globalisation, and that today form the background to transnational 
co-operation and networking on the far right agenda.
Transnational networks – extreme right – neo-Nazism – pan-Europeanism
sAmenvAtting
De transnationaliteit van Europese nationalistische bewegingen
Dit artikel onderzoekt grondgedachten en beweegredenen van de transnationale 
mobilisatie van fascistische en neonazistische sociale bewegingen. Het stelt vast 
dat pan-Europeanisme een basisdogma vormt, en geen contraprincipe, van het 
extreem-nationalistische gedachtegoed. Dat wordt aangetoond aan de hand van 
enkele eigentijdse voorbeelden van Duitse extraparlementaire organisaties die een 
antiglobalistische of antikapitalistische ideologie aanhangen, en hun filosofische en 
historische voorlopers. Daarbij worden reactionaire ideeën belicht die streven naar 
het ‘behoud’ en de ‘heropwekking’ van een Europese Geest of Cultuur als een dam 
tegen vermeende dreigingen van globalisering. Zij vormen vandaag de achtergrond 
van transnationale samenwerking en netwerking tussen extreemrechtse groepen. 
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résumé
La transnationalité des mouvements nationalistes européens
Cet article examine les idées de base et les motivations de la mobilisation 
transnationale des mouvements sociaux néonazis et fascistes. Il démontre que le 
pan-européanisme, loin d’en être le contre-pied, constitue au contraire la base même 
de l’idéologie d’extrême-droite nationaliste. L’étude se focalise sur les organisations 
allemandes extraparlementaires qui souscrivent à une idéologie anticapitaliste ou 
‘antimondialiste’ et sur leurs antécédents historiques et philosophiques. Elle analyse 
les idées réactionnaires visant à la ‘préservation’ ou au ‘réveil’ d’un Esprit ou d’une 
Culture européens contre les menaces de la mondialisation. Cette dernière constitue 
l’arrière-fonds de la coopération et du maillage transnational entre les groupements 
d’extrême droite. 
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